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INTRODUCTION 
Fiscal and monetary policies are tools policymakers use either independently or in 
combination to direct changes in national economy. Although both authorities are 
independently responsible for their respective areas of policy, they work within a 
framework which takes into consideration the actions of the other. Generally, several 
economic scholars in their theoretical and empirical studies relate these policies as they 
operate interdependently to ensure stability of the economy.  However, several results of 
these studies further sum up that the degree of effectiveness vary depending on the 
country’s economic priorities Mohammed et al (2010). 
In fact, the relative effectiveness of fiscal and monetary policies in stabilizing demand 
pressures requires a coordinated effort of both policies to deal with huge fiscal deficits and 
high inflationary pressures. Mohammad et al., (2010) says in his study that these policies 
are dependent to each other and pursuing only one policy without considering the other 
may not produce the desired results. This implies that lack of good policy coordination in 
the management of the economy may cause economic distortions even when policies seem 
strategically oriented to achieving their respective objectives.  
Nordhaus (1994) postulated that under certain assumptions, countries may suffer huge 
budget deficits and higher real interest rates than expected when fiscal and monetary 
authorities operate independently. This may happen especially when fiscal authorities are 
reluctant towards reducing spending decisions. As result, financing of such deficits tend to 
deviate inflation developments away from their policy targets. In another study by Shabbir 
& Ahmed (1994) noted that fiscal deficits directly affect inflation through viable 
transmission channel of price expectations.   
ABSTRACT 
This paper attempts to quantify the coordination between 
monetary and fiscal policies in Rwanda   from 2008 to 2018. The 
paper uses Granger causality test and vector autoregressive (VAR) 
framework to determine whether these policies are implemented 
independently and also looks at the extent of their coordination. 
The empirical results using   unstructured VAR model suggest that 
monetary and fiscal policies interact and are coordinated in 
Rwanda. The impulse response functions demonstrate significant 
interaction between monetary and fiscal policy. For instance a 
positive shock on government expenditure induces an increase in 
broad money that in turn induces an increase in liquidity in the 
economy. Finally, the paper recommends that both policies should 
continue interacting in order to strengthen policy coordination. 
Therefore, ultimately achieve a stable and low inflation together 
with high growth. 
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However, in poorly coordinated macroeconomic environment, monetary policy has 
remained passive to fiscal policy. In this regard, fiscal policy directly affects monetary 
policy through substantial increases in indirect tax rates, which have direct impact on 
inflation. The fiscal measures also indirectly affect the aggregate demand via their impact 
on monetary variables such as interest rates, interest rate spreads and exchange rate. Albeit 
the fiscal expansion is not monetized, the persistence of higher deficits may instigate the 
increase in net credit demands, driving up interest rates and crowding out private sector 
investment. 
In view of the above, Sargent &  Wallace (1981) establish that high inflation and 
inflation expectations result when fiscal authorities set their expansionary spending 
objectives that ultimately need to be monetized independently of public sector liabilities. In 
an amended version of their model, they note that where fiscal policy is unsustainable, 
monetary authority loose its ability to control inflation. 
In this regard, in its mandate to support the Government’s macroeconomic policies, the 
central bank adopted a collaborative strategy with the government to provide a clear 
pathway for pursuing a consistent policy mix. Thus, the BNR is liaised with the Ministry 
of Finance and Economic Planning (MINECOFIN) through Treasury Management 
Committee (TMC) and Debt Management Committee (DMC). The TMC serves as an 
analytical platform for refining policy implementation and forecasts. This framework has 
quite significantly improved the basic nature of the interaction between monetary and 
fiscal authorities. 
Under this context, in Rwanda, the law no 55/2007 of 30/11/2007 governing the 
National Bank of Rwanda sanctions the Central Bank as a national institution with legal 
personality and independence in operational, administrative and financial areas. The Bank 
preserves this autonomy in pursuit of macroeconomic missions. However, fiscal discipline 
is required for achieving the objectives of the monetary and exchange rate policy. Unsound 
fiscal policy usually create expectations leading to political pressures on the Bank to either 
accommodate higher inflation or lower interest rate in order to lessen the debt of the 
Government sector. 
Law no 48/2017 of 23/09/2017 governing the National Bank of Rwanda (NBR) 
sanctions the Central Bank as a national institution with legal personality and 
independence in operational, administrative and financial areas. This law assigns to the 
NBR responsibility of formulating   and implementing monetary policy by ensuring low 
and stable inflation. However, fiscal discipline is required for achieving this primary 
objective because unsound fiscal policies usually create expectations leading to political 
pressures on the central banks to either accommodate higher inflation or lower interest rate 
in order to lessen the debt of the Government sector.  
Macroeconomic framework consists of formulation and monitoring of macroeconomic 
policies including issues relating to analysis and projections. The four core macroeconomic 
sectors; real sector, fiscal sector, monetary sector and external sector and subsequent 
policies such as debt policy compel central banks and governments to work closely. 
To support the Government’s macroeconomic policies, NBR adopted a collaborative 
strategy with the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning (MINECOFIN(2017) to 
provide a clear pathway for pursuing a consistent policy mix. Thus, the NBR is liaised with 
MINECOFIN through Treasury Management Committee (TMC) and Debt Management 
Committee (DMC). The TMC serves as an analytical platform for refining policy 
implementation and forecasts, while DMC considers future issuance, including the balance 
between overdraft, bill issuance and bond issuance.  
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High levels of coordination implies a reduction of policy conflicts that could result in 
the economy operating at a lower than optimal level, and a greater ability to respond to 
adverse external shocks, as well as sustainable growth path alongside low inflation, and an 
overall improvement in the economic well-being of citizens of the country.  Likewise, in 
poorly coordinated macroeconomic environment, monetary policy has remained passive to 
fiscal policy (Farooq Arby 2010) 
Rwanda’s fiscal and monetary policy coordination focuses on different areas including: 
supply shocks, treasury management and investments in treasury bills. The central bank 
also participates in the issuing and distribution of treasury securities, transactions relating 
to public debt servicing, negotiation of securities, as well as the issue of advance to 
government.  
Despite vast literature on the coordination between fiscal and monetary policies in 
developing countries. To the best of   my knowledge, there is not a single study that has 
attempted to assess monetary-fiscal policy coordination in Rwanda. This paper therefore 
attempts to evaluate to what the extent fiscal and monetary policies are coordinated in 
Rwanda over the period 2008- 2018.  Literature has shown that empirical result on this 
matter have been so far mixed and this study attempts to shed light on this issue by 
providing empirical estimates for the case of Rwanda. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 explores literature review, 
Section 3 reviews some stylized facts about the coordination between monetary and fiscal 
policies in Rwanda while section 4 describes the methodology used to assess the extent of 
the coordination between the monetary and fiscal policies. Section 5 consists of 
presentation and discussion of the results and finally section 6 is about the conclusion and 
recommendations 
 
RESEARCH METHODS 
This is paper attempts to quantify  to what  extent the fiscal and monetary policy are 
coordinated in Rwanda, To achieve this objective, we borrowed the methodology by 
Andlib et al (2012) in  Pakistan who used unrestricted VAR model which consists of four 
variables: unemployment or output gap , inflation   interest rate and fiscal balance. For this 
case, repo and broad money are used as monetary variables while government expenditure, 
public domestic debt and fiscal deficit/ GDP are used on the side of fiscal policy based on 
the nature of our fiscal and monetary policy framework. 
Before we examine the extent of coordination, it makes sense to test empirically the 
independence of monetary policy from fiscal policy because the coordination arises the 
two institutions charged with the respective policies are operationally independent. In this 
regard, we apply Granger causality test borrowed from Andlib et al (2012), on a 
combination of monetary and fiscal policy indicators. 
The study follows a VAR model to chart out the way policies have behaved over the 
period of analysis, and we perform a VAR for five variables categorized according to 
respective policies for the period 2008 Q1-2018 Q4.  
Since their introduction by Sims (1980), the VAR models are arguably among the most 
popular models to analyze the macroeconomic dynamics, the greatest advantage being the 
possibility to observe the macroeconomic system following a shock to the other variables 
IV.1 Model specification  
A VAR consists of a set of n endogenous variables     ) and the 
VAR process is defined as       
Where Ai are n×n coefficients matrices for i=1,…….p  and  is an 
unobservable n dimensional  error process. 
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Our simple VAR model consists of a set of 5 variables namely M3, GOV, PUB, FISC 
and r Where M3 represents broad money, GOV represents government expenditure, FISC 
represents fiscal balance, PUB represents domestic public debt and r represents interest 
rates especially repo rate. 
To quantify to what extent the fiscal and monetary policies are coordinated, we analyze 
the responses of the different variables by using the Impulse Response Function from the 
VAR model. This method enables us to capture how fiscal and monetary variable respond 
to each other from their shocks. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
As described in literature and methodology we have variables on fiscal side as well as 
monetary variables. Government expenditure, public domestic debt and fiscal balance are 
used as fiscal variable while repo rate and broad money are used as monetary variables. 
The data were obtained from the National Bank of Rwanda reports and ministry of finance 
and economic planning 
Normally, it is essential to ascertain the stationarity of variables before proceeding to 
other empirical tests. In this paper the researcher used the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test to 
check for null hypothesis of non-stationarity and to determine the order of integration of 
variables as in table below.  
Table 1. Stationarity tests 
Variables 
ADF test statistic 
(Absolute Values) 
Critical Values Order of 
integration 1% 5% 10% 
Repo rate  -5.4 
-1.9 
-3.54 
-3.54 
-2.93 
-2.93 
-2.60 
-2.60 
I(I) 
I(0) 
Lgov -2.95 
-0.98 
-3.59 
-3.59 
-2.93 
-2.93 
-2.60 
-2.60 
I(I) 
I(0) 
FISC -5.00 
-1.47 
-2.44 
-3.61 
-3.61 
-3.61 
-2.94 
-2.94 
-2.94 
-2.60 
-2.60 
-2.60 
I(II) 
I(0) 
I(I) 
LM3 -2.94 
-2.31 
-3.61 
-3.61 
-2.93 
-2.94 
-2.60 
-2.60 
I(I) 
I(0) 
LPUB -4.27 
0.3 
-1.59 
3.63 
-3.63 
-3.63 
2.95 
-2.95 
-2.95 
2.61 
-2.61 
-2.61 
I(II) 
I(0) 
I(I) 
Source: Author computation  
 With an automatic lag length selection using Schwarz information criterion (SIC), the 
results of augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test reported in the table above indicate that   
repo rate, government expenditure and broad money are integrated at first difference while 
fiscal deficit/GDP and public domestic debt are integrated at second difference. To this 
effect the null hypothesis of non-stationarity is rejected given that the absolute values of 
ADF are greater than the critical values at whatever the threshold (i.e 1%, 5% and 10%). 
 
Policy Independence in Rwanda  
The coordination between fiscal and monetary policy arises only if the two institutions 
charged with the respective policies are operationally independent, if moves of one 
institution depend on the actions of other, then coordination is inherently ensured 
(Muhammad Farooq Arby et al, 2010).  Before I examine the extent of coordination and 
interaction, it makes sense to test empirically the independence of monetary policy from 
fiscal policy. 
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  In this regard, we apply Granger causality test on a combination of monetary and fiscal 
policy indicators such as repo rate and broad money on one side and fiscal balance ratio to 
GDP, domestic public debt and government expenditure   on the other side.  We also 
explore the existence of co-integration taking into account the aforementioned combination 
of proxies for the respective policies. 
Table 2. Pairwise Granger Causality Tests 
Null Hypothesis: Obs F-Statistic Prob. 
     LM3 does not Granger Cause FISC  42  1.12651 0.3350 
 FISC does not Granger Cause LM3  0.60408 0.5519 
 REPO does not Granger Cause FISC  42  0.89817 0.4160 
 FISC does not Granger Cause REPO  3.72114 0.0337 
 LM3 does not Granger Cause LGOV  42  0.29544 0.7459 
 LGOV does not Granger Cause LM3  3.91858 0.0286 
     REPO does not Granger Cause LGOV  42  11.6291 0.0001 
 LGOV does not Granger Cause REPO  0.76783 0.4713 
     LPUB does not Granger Cause LM3  42  0.47700 0.6244 
 LM3 does not Granger Cause LPUB  2.72447 0.0787 
     REPO does not Granger Cause LPUB  42  0.95285 0.3949 
 LPUB does not Granger Cause REPO  0.66847 0.5186 
Source: Author estimation 
 The results of pair wise Granger causality for different combinations of proxies for 
monetary and fiscal policies as reported in the table above reveal that generally the 
indicators for respective policies do not cause one another rather there is unidirectional   
causality between fiscal balance, repo, money supply and government expenditure. 
Because there is no bidirectional causality between variables, in this regard, we deduce that 
monetary policy is operationally independent in Rwanda.  This is reflected in the 
independence with which Rwanda central bank implements its monetary policy. 
Table 3. Results of Engle-Granger residual based co-integration 
Dependent Tau-statistic Prob.* Z-Statistic PROB.* 
REPO -2.38594  0.3458 -11.7632  0.2211 
FISC -2.11844  0.4743 -8.49208  0.4216 
REPO -2.14474  0.4611 -9.71139  0.3361 
LGOV -1.06916  0.8890 -2.94805  0.8793 
REPO -2.20976  0.4290 -10.3856  0.2943 
LPUB -0.92939  0.9144 -2.89077  0.8830 
LM3 -1.98093  0.5437 -13.4804  0.1497 
FISC -2.8923  0.1601 -24.0842  0.0082 
LPUB -2.52195  0.2875 -17.2932  0.0583 
LM3 -2.47126  0.3087 -15.4331  0.0937 
LM3 -3.70611  0.0316 -212.839  0.0000 
LGOV -3.79327  0.0259 -245.434  0.0000 
Source: Author estimations 
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 The results of  single equation  residual based  Engle-Granger co-integration test 
presented in the above table also supports the outcome as the null hypothesis of no co-
integration is rejected given that p-values for both tau and z statistics are insignificant 
implying that there is no co-movement in most of the variable combinations in the long 
run. However the co-movement exist between M3 and government expenditure  
respectively, The presence of long run relationship between M3 and government 
expenditures insinuates  that  when the government increases its expenditures, this in turn  
will increase money supply in the different economic agents in turn  increase broad money.  
 
Policy Coordination  
Fiscal and monetary policy coordination is considered essential in macroeconomic 
management. In this respect, coordination exists when both policies respond to a particular 
macroeconomic challenge in a consistent manner and takes places via various modes such 
as exchange of information and joint decision making between policy makers from 
respective institutions. Thus, the VAR approach is used here-under to demonstrate the 
coordination between monetary and fiscal policy. 
  
Table 5. Vector autoregressive estimates 
 FISC LGOV LM3 LPUB REPO 
FISC(-1)  0.904694 -0.011130  0.083829 -0.081973  0.794428 
  (0.09233)  (0.00853)  (0.04103)  (0.04323)  (0.55040) 
 [ 9.79887] [-1.30430] [ 2.04297] [-1.89632] [ 1.44337] 
LGOV(-1) -0.544822  0.956243  0.594116 -0.250021 -1.801631 
  (0.39254)  (0.03628)  (0.17446)  (0.18379)  (2.34011) 
 [-1.38794] [ 26.3568] [ 3.40549] [-1.36038] [-0.76989] 
LM3(-1)  0.159185  0.011000  0.593761  0.223869  2.030305 
  (0.26342)  (0.02435)  (0.11707)  (0.12333)  (1.57038) 
 [ 0.60430] [ 0.45182] [ 5.07170] [ 1.81514] [ 1.29288] 
LPUB(-1)  0.161178  0.016442 -0.026244  0.955198 -0.276684 
  (0.10850)  (0.01003)  (0.04822)  (0.05080)  (0.64680) 
 [ 1.48554] [ 1.63961] [-0.54426] [ 18.8037] [-0.42777] 
REPO(-1) -0.030243  0.009356 -0.010992  0.015624  0.768401 
  (0.01462)  (0.00135)  (0.00650)  (0.00685)  (0.08717) 
 [-2.06830] [ 6.92276] [-1.69141] [ 2.28219] [ 8.81507] 
C  1.396898  0.082546 -0.380898  0.013084 -0.535795 
  (0.67556)  (0.06244)  (0.30024)  (0.31630)  (4.02734) 
 [ 2.06776] [ 1.32203] [-1.26863] [ 0.04137] [-0.13304] 
Source: Author Estimation 
 
     The results of VAR test show, that there is evidence of strong coordination between 
fiscal and monetary policy. Lagged fiscal deficit   affects positively broad money and it is 
statistically significant.   Government expenditure also affects positively money supply and 
it is statistically significant this is evidenced by how government together with the central 
bank pursued expansionary policy to stimulate the economic activity. This necessitated 
both monetary and fiscal authorities to coordinate and raise enough funds to finance the 
economy thereby pursuing expansionary policies. Therefore, it is clear that there is an 
evidence of coordination 
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Policy interaction in Rwanda 
From the empirical perspective, we test for policy interaction by examining the dynamic 
impulse responses of selected macroeconomic variables to shocks in either monetary or 
fiscal policies. 
In the context of this study, out of five variables that are taken for analysis, three are 
fiscal side variables (government expenditure, domestic public debt and budget balance) 
and two are monetary side variables (Repo rate and broad money). To examine policy 
interaction we employ unstructured VAR model and this is done by estimating the impulse 
response functions to obtain the dynamic responses of monetary policy variables in 
reaction to shocks in fiscal policy and vice-versa. 
An important finding is that a positive shock on lagged government expenditure depicts 
a positive and significant response broad money after three quarters, since our tax revenues 
cover less of   government spending, the Government   might use   central bank through 
domestic borrowing via issuance of government securities, obtaining short-term loans such 
as overdrafts.  
These findings are supported by the mechanism of monetary –fiscal coordination that is 
manifested in constant discussions   between the National Bank of Rwanda and the 
Ministry of Finance and Economic planning through setting of medium term targets for 
growth and inflation within a technical working group known as Macroframe. 
For example in 2008-2009 global financial crisis affected virtually all the economies 
including Rwanda. Rwanda registered high level of growth but with the highest levels of 
inflation. To insulate the effects of high inflationary pressures the central bank together 
with the ministry of finance tightened their policies 
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CONCLUSSION 
The coordination between monetary and fiscal policy plays a crucial role in stabilization of 
the economy therefore, implementation of a sound fiscal policy creates room for an active 
monetary policy. This paper employs quarterly data to explore the monetary-fiscal policy 
coordination in Rwanda between the period 2008Q1-2018Q4. We employed government 
expenditure, fiscal deficit per GDP and public domestic debt as fiscal policy proxies while 
broad money and repo rate were used as monetary policy proxies. Tests from granger 
causality revealed the independence of central bank from fiscal policies, The results of the 
VAR model showed the evidence of coordination between Rwandan fiscal and monetary 
policy where by tests revealed  in this period  both central bank and government pursued 
expansionary policies to stimulate the economy activities. 
 The findings from the study revealed that there is an evidence of policy coordination of 
the two institutions, Further; the paper analyzes the interactions between monetary and 
fiscal policies using VAR approach through estimating dynamic impulse response 
functions (IRF) to provide policy interaction. 
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